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INTRODUCTION
There is, perhaps, in our whole economic system no institution which has been so bitterly attacked and so stoutly defende
as the stock exchange.

Those who are employed in connection

with it and those who make money on it (or hope to) extoll it as
the typically American institution where opportunity waits to be
grasped by the clever and aggressive.

Reto~ers

ot all types

and their sympathizers condemn it as a gambling den and the center ot seltish Wall street control ot the finances ot the nation.

To examine and evaluate all these points ot view being a

work ot too wide a scope, the present writer will attempt to
analyze only the more important ones.

Those chosen are the fol-

lowing: the attitude of unqualified approval as represented by
J. Edward Meeker, official economist and apologist of the New
York Stock Exchange; the trankly critical view ot, tor example,
John T. Flynn, the debunker of "benevolent big business and
high tinance" mytha; and the more moderate and analytical view-

point ot Msgr. John A. Ryan, one ot the most outstanding Catholic economists and ethicians.

In the course of the work various

other writers will be cited, but these three seem to represent
extraordinarily well their respective schools ot thought, and
taken together have put down all the principal arguments pro an
contra the stock exchange.
iv
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In order to simplify this treatment and make it more
definite, the New York Stock Exchange will be used to typify
all the exchanges of the country, since it is the prototype and
the one which all the others admittedly try to imitate.

For-

eign exchanges have been excluded because their different
methods of dOing bUsiness and their various positions in the
financial life of their respective countries would only contuse
the issue.

However, mutatis mutandis, the main conclUsions of

this thesis should apply to them also.

Likwise, it was thought

well to omit an analysis of the grain exchanges, and to contine
the discussion solely to the stock market.

This rule is fol-

lowed except in the consideration of short selling, where the
hedging operations in grain throw considerable light upon the
corresponding operations in stooks, by way both of similarity
and of contrast.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the stockexchang
and its opera"t!iona from an ethical point ot view in order to
determine whether or not they occupy a legitimate pOSition in
our modern economic life.

In this sor.t ot study it is neces ..

sary, ot course, to proceed step by step, tirst analyzing the
stock market

~

!!, determining whether or not it is a natural

and necessary growth, or one which has been fostered tor the
selfish interests of a few speculators.

In the second chapter

are considered two ot the most mooted practices ot the exchange
margin trading and short selling.

These, also, will be exam-

ined in themselves and without regard to the abuses to which
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they may have given rise.

To adopt this procedure is not to

deny the abuses whioh have undoubtedly orept in# nor is it to
deny the neoessity or abolishing praotioes which, although good
in themselves, have become hopelessly oorrupt.

It is only when
,

things are distinguished rrom their misuse that a clear picture
can be had or them, and judgment oan be made whether or not
their abuse is inextricably linked with their use.

In the

third chapter this whole question or the abuse of stock exchange practices is taken up 1n the light or the work of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
reasons, have urged that the stock

Many, with seemingly solid
e~hange

be suppressed as a

hopelessly corrupt inst1tut1on, whose members are too crarty
and whose procedure is too complicated ever to be rerormed at
all.

The task, indeed, has been d1rr1cult and involved, but

the Secur1ties and Exchange Commission has set about 1t w1th
rearlessness and ardor, and the result is a good argument ror
the rerormabi11ty of the exchange.

In the rourth chapter are

considered the wider economic and social imp11cations or widespread speculation both berore and arter the advent or the SEC.
No attempt will be made to treat in an exhaustive manner
every eth1cal aspect of the exchange and its practices •. A mere
glance at the rules and regulations or the SEC will make evi. dent the impossibi11t7 of such a course.

Rather the attempt

will be to examine thoroughly the more salient and disputed
points and the larger aspects or the question.
To one tra1ned in scholastic ph11osophy the lack or the
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terminology of the schools in an analysis professedly from
the scholastic point of view may seem a bit disconcerting, but
it is hoped that the necessary ideas are expressed clearly,
even though they be in modern form.

Since this thesis was writ-

ten not only tor scholars but also for the perusal of the "average" business man, it is expressed in terms which he will understand, and its ethical judgments are based upon norms which he
will admit.

These norms, therefore, are rather proximate, and

are not reduced to the more fundamental ones which might be
termed more philosophical.

Not for that reason, however,

should they be any less valid and objective.

One ot the tre-

quently used criteria, for example, is that of "naturalness".
Since most economic operations are wholly indifferent in themselves, they must be judged mainly from their effects upon individuals or the community at aarge.

Such are most processes

which grow up, as it were, by reason of the very exigencies of
the Situation, or in other words, in,a "natural" manner.

An

example of this would be the wholesale grocery business.

The

small retailer, occupied with his customers and buying in
meager quantities, needs someone who can contact the large producers, buy their goods in large quantities, and then break
them up into small lots for distribution.

Thus the wholesaling

of groceries is a legitimate business because it grows up naturally through an exigency ot the economic process of distribution, and because it benefits some and per!! injures none.

The

phrase "injures none" must be taken in the social as well as in-
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dividual sense, since an institution which may provide a living
for a number of individuals and may directly injure no one, may
yet be an unnatural and harmful growth in the social body as a
whole inasmuch as it may be wholly useless, and thus would retain the energies ot its operators trom more socially usetul
production.

This is a charge commonly made against the stock

exchange, and will be considered in detail in the last chapter.
The word ·usetul" is to be taken merely in the sense of a
means toward the attainment ot some good or indifferent end.
And since the procuring of the means of livelihood for the individual and the expansion of production, especially in the
modern world ot underconsumption and unemployment (speaking ot
pre-war conditions), are good and deSirable, they are used as
valid criteria in the ethical evaluation ot eeonomic institutions and practices.
Another method which should prove usetu1 toward making
clear the essential nature ot the exchange and its practices
and toward treeing them trom the obscurity arising from their
complex nature, it to compare them with the more common and
completely understood transactions ot daily business life, especially those whose legitimacy is never questioned.

Thereby

is eliminated the greatest difficulty under whicb controversy
over the stock exchange labors -- a failure to grasp what is
the state of the question.

CHAPTER I
THE STOCK EXCHANGE AS A MARKET
In order to understand fully the nature of the stock exchange and its position in the economic set-up of today, it will
clarify matters greatly to consider its origin and development.
For this institution has grown so large and complex in the mere
physical mechanism necessary to carryon its business that its
essential nature has been greatly obscured except to the discern
ing economist.

Some have even condemned it on the score of com-

plexity alone, arguing that such an elaborate system of clerks,
offices, tickers and other paraphernalia is uneconomic and
wasteful for the simple transaction of transferring shares of
stock.

But a brief glance at the history of the exchange will

reveal that all its present complexity, or at least the greater
part of it, was introduced gradually by force of circumstances,
and generally to prevent the creeping in of abuses.
The institution known today as the New York Stock Exchange
had its beginning on May 17, 1792 in an agreement signed by
twenty-four brokers of New York City binding themselves to give
preference to each other in their negotiations and to establish
a minimum commission of one-quarter of one percent.

At first

all trading was done under an old buttonwood tree at 68 Wall St.
and it was not until 1817 that a room was hired in which to
1

2

conduct trading.

As the volume or business increased, it was

found necessary to replace the informal trades performed at the
leisure of the individual brokers by having the President eall
the various stocks singly from time to time in order that all
wishing to trade in any particular stock might do so together
and at the same time.

The pre-Civil War expansion of the rail-

roads soon brought large issues of these securities to the
Exchange, and constantly necessitated ever stricter and more
elaborate procedure in handling the individual transactions.
In 1867 the electric stock ticker was introduced to give
speedier and more accurate quotation service both to New York
City and, later on, to all the distant cities of the United
states and Canada.

In 1878, in order to allow of more rapid

communication between members on the floor of the Exchange and
brokers' offices, telephones were first installed, and similarly, telegraph lines soon spread out from New York to all the
other centers or investment funds throughout the country.

1

All these improvements, and many lesser ones;, devi sed by
the business man's ingenuity aided by the advance or

technolog~

at length produced an institution which is probably the most
bewilderingly complicated of any in the modern economic world.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the amateur economist,
overlooking the trading floor of the Exchange rrom the visitors' gallery, and watching a thousand or more persons rushing

----------

1 ;r. Edward Meeker, The Work of the Stock Exchange, Revised Ed.,
Ronald Press Co., New York, 1930, 63 sq.
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around like mad -- shouting quotations, waving hands, and
dashing to the innmnerable telephones which line the walls
it is not surprising that such a person should decide that here
is the simple economic transaction of exchange of goods gone
mad with complexity, which, he may suspect, is contrived for
the sole purpose of impressing and overwhelming the unsuspecting investor.

In a word, it looks more like a giant casino at

Monte Carlo than a place for staid appraisal and evaluation of
sound business enterprise. 2
However, all this machinery of exchange has been found
necessary to achieve what economists call the "perfect market",
which is found nowhere else but in the organized

exchange~.

A perfect market is one in whioh there is always only one price
for any given item at anyone time, and in which all buyers and
sellers are in continuous oommunioation with one another, and
have complete information ooncerning everything pertaining to
market conditions.

3

The first condition is accurately ful-

filled on the stook exchange, although only in recent years was
it able to devise a means of getting a uniform "opening" price
on active securities.

The second condition is in large measure

fulfilled by the inter-city wire connections of the brokers.
The individual buyer in a distant city has no personal contact,

2--------For a detailed

exposition and evaluation
Exchange operations, consult Meeker, OPe
VI, and XV to XVII.
3 Fred R. Fairchild, Edgar S. Furniss, and
Elementary Economics, Macmillan Co., New

of the mechanics of
cit., Chapters I to
Norman S. Buck,
York, 1926, I, 285.

4

of course, with the one who sells to him, but his agent, the
broker on the floor of the Exchange, is, as concerns everything pertaining to the market, in touch with every other buyer
and seller.

The third condition, that of complete knowlege of

the market, can never be verified anywhere, but nowhere else
are such comprehensive efforts made to keep participants informed of market conditions.

Passing over the periodic reports,

which the Exchange requires to be published by all corporations
,

whose stocks are listed, we may mention the "ticker" serVice,
which publishes every transaction over the whole country within
ten minutes of its consummation.

Thus, although the stock

Exchange does not attain to all the requisites of a perfect
market, "the closeness of the approach ••••• would surprise the
uninitiated." 4
These few considerations supply the basic material wherewith an approach can be made to the ethical position of the
stock exchange in the modern American economic set-up.

First

of all, practically no one today will deny the legitimacy of
the corporation in present-day society, and moreover, it is
outside the scope of this study to establish such a legitimacy.
It is not to be denied that drastic regulation and even reorganization of big business may be necessary; but if private
ownership is to remain a part of our national economy, it is
difficult to see how it can be maintained except through the
distribution of shares of stock into the hands of individuals.
4

Ibid. 286.

And most economists would say the wider the distribution
Wow, it is this wide distribution ot stock that

the better.

calls tor some sort_ot market tor their exchange, tor the exeroise ot the right ot ownership includes the treedom to dispose

ot all acquired holdings at will.
So tar there appears no ditticulty.

But the nature ot cor-

poration securities makes tor a kind ot market with which the
average man, and even the average business man, is totally unacquainted in his daily commercial transactions.

For shares ot

stock ot the same ·class· in any given company are entirely and
exactly homogeneous -- a condition which obtains in extremely
tew markets in the world.

'!'he metal, grain and commodity mar-

kets, it is true, trade in standard grades, but when it comes
to actual delivery, allowances must be made tor variations trom
the standard.

And in ordinary commercial transactions, both

wholesale and retail, variations in quality must be caretully
watched tor and accurately appraised.

Hence, the market tor by

tar the largest number ot commodities and articles bought aDd
sold in the business world, i8 conducted in a more or leas personal way, i.e., by contact at the buyer with the seller in
such a way that the concentration ot all buyers and sellers 1n
one place, especially tor continuous trading, is practically
impossible.

But the buying and selling ot corporation securi-

ties is entirely ditterent.

Here, ant share ot General Motor.

common stock is exactly identical with every other share ot the
same stock, and so the buyer has merely to specity hi. preter-
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ence and leave the rest up to his agent or broker.

As a

result of this characteristic, the bU7ers and sellers
poration shares have inevitab17

~avitated

or

cor-

to one place, where

the bU7ers may most easily tind sellers, and sellers buyers.

or

supply and demand, one at
the distinguishing features ot the ·pertect U market is to be
Naturally, under this system

found -- that

or

only one price for any item at any given time.

And it must be remembered that the word Uperteet U is used here
by the economist chiefly in an ethical sense; a perrect market
is one in which a fair price is arrived at by tree competition
among all participants, who all have equal and adequate knowlege of market conditions.

The centralized market, therefore,

assures one condition ot a fair price -- that no one be charged
more than another tor the same commodity at the same time.

The

justiticatioaof this feature of the stock exchange needs no
further e1ucidatieD at this time from the viewpoint of the
ethics

or

the just price.

Its saving to the individual i. quite

evident to the business man who must consume much time in comparing bids and prices before buying.

Its social saving is

sUfficiently deMonstrated by a consideration of the waste involved both in the -shopping around" of the wary and the inveigling
of the unwary.
One or the features ot the stock exchange, bowever, 'Which
greatly obscures its economic function is that of its complicated and e1aborate17 technical machinery ot operation, which
tends to give the exchange the appearance ot a glorified Monte

7

Carlo rather than the dign1ried air desirable in a rinancial
institution, such as is round, ror example, in a large bank.
To investigate and justiry this maChinery would require the services or a trained erricienoy expert, and henoe would rall outside the soopeor this thesis.

Surrice it to say, that during

the past thirteen years, when the exchange and its members, ror
laok ot business, have been toroed to retrench to an extent
whioh would have been believed Lmpossible in, the twenties, the
number ot employees has been drastically out, but not one ot
the departments was eliminated or oODso+idated.
The next point to be oonsider&d 1s the organisation and
control ot the Exchange, sinoe, although the legitimaoy ot the
market itself may be beyond doubt, yet the particulars ot organization aDd business methods may be open to question.

The New

York Stock Exchange is an association ot some 1100 members, eaoh

ot whom own. a ·seat" on the Exchange, and who may trade tor
themselves exclUSively, or act as brokers tor others in several
ditterent ways (each ot which will be oonsidered separately
hereatter), or do both.

The original agreement, signed in 1792,

contained two prinoipal provisos -- that the contracting parties
give each other preterence in their dealings, and that they
adhere to a minimum commission.

Since that time, the rules and

regulations have expanded to inolude methods ot doing business
and the treatment ot customers with regard to margins, statementa, eto., but the two original clauses are still the most
important.

The Exchange now prescribes a strict scale .ot com-

~-~------------------------------------------------------------~
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missions from which no member may depart except under penalty,
and has restricted the buying and selling of "listed" securities
so as to prohiblt tradlng in them by lts members anywhere but
on the floor of the Exchange.

Such legislation practlcally es-

tablishes a pure monopoly slnce the effort and dlfflculty of
finding a buyer for a certaln number of shares, especlally an
·odd lot· (any fractlon of 100 shares), are practically insuperable.

Here and there in outly1ng t1nancial centers there 1s a

certain very small amount ot trading done "over the counter"
(l.e., between 1nd1vidual and 1nd1v1dual or tirm and t1rm, but
d1rectly and Dot through any organ1zed exchange), but generally
the 1nconvenience 1s not worth the trouble ot making arrangements as to de11very, payment and transfer ot stock, allot
which are cared tor automatlcally by stock exChange regulat1ons.
As has already been pointed out, the grav1tat10n of the
buy1ng and selling ot corporat1on shares to one central market
is quite

nat~al

and lnevltable, and 1t 1s but one more natural

step to the control ot thls market by a monopo11stic association.
To one who has watched' trading on the tloor of the Exchange, lt
will be evident what a large amount ot bUsiness is handled by a
comparatlvely small number ot men, and to one familiar with the
procedure of buying and selling 1t wlll likewise'be evident
what experlence and business integr1ty are necessary for the
conduct ot the business.

~e

varlous brokers gather around the

·post· at which the particular stook in whioh they are interested is traded, and bid or otfer, as the case may be.

Every

trade is consummated b7 mere word ot mouth or even a nod

o~

the head, which because ot the volume ot business to be done,
is all that there is time tor.

No written contract whatever is

exchanged, aDd the onl7 check-up made is done at the clearing
house when the slips turned in b7 bU7ers and sellers are matched
against each other.

The matching, however, is continuous thru-

out the da7, and in normal business times is accomplished
a halt-hour atter the trade is made.

~th1D

Such a procedure requires

that each man allowed on the trading tloor be both responsible
tor all the commitments whiCh he ma7 make, and experienced

enoug~

to trade exped1tious17 and accurate17, since in the excitement
which alwa7s characterizes operations it is ver7 eas7 to make a
mistake.

Theretore, the on17 "7 business can be done is b7

means ot a h1gb17-restricted group; restricted in numbers in
order to keep the total within what a reasonable trading area
can supp17 space

~or,

and restricted in tinancial standing to

those who can turnish a bond (in the torm ot a deposit with the
stock Clearing Corporation) sufticient to guarantee all their
contracts.

This latter provision is ot the utmost importance

in a market which demands implicit confidence among its members,
since trading is done with no discrimination ot persons.

Even

it one broker were suspicious ot the tinancial condition ot
another, he could not b7 rule avoid doing business with him.
The stock exchange, theretore, is ot necessit7 a pure monopol7
and high17 exclusive organization, and onl7 as such can it
sateguard and toster its own and the public interest.

CHAPTER II
MARGIN TRADING AND SHORT SELLING
Two ot the most controverted practices on the exchange are
short selling and buying on margin.

Since short selling i8 also

done "on margin", the buying transaction will be examined first.
Throughout the discussion it must be kept in mind that the purpose of this chapter is solely to establish the ethical nature
of these practices

~

themselves, and not to consider their

long-range social effects, or even to enter into the abuses
which they may occasion.

All that will be taken up later.

Buying on margin, despite the esoteric connotation of the
term, is basically a very simple, familiar, and accepted method
of financing a purchase throughout the commercial world.

1

The

purchaser buys some stock, makes a down payment, and then
arranges with his broker for a loan with which to pay the seller
in full, which must be done within two days, as all transactions
on the exchange are for cash.

The broker, of course, to protect

his loan, requires'that there be a considerable "margin" betwee
the current value of the stock and the amount of the loan.

The

exact size of the margin, before the days of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, depended upon the broker's experienced

i-;;;-;-;~mplete discussion and evaluation of margin buying and
short selling and their manifold implications, see Meeker,
cit., Chapter VII, ·Credit Transactions in Securities."
10

OPe
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judgment as to how likely the price ot the stock was to take
a sudden tall.

It the margin becomes too "narrow", the broker

calls his customer for more security, which may be given in the
torm of money or ot marketable stocks and bonds.

Essentially,

theretore, buying on margin is no different from bu71ng a home
on a mortgage.

In each case the owner must make over to the

loaning agency full ti tle to his equity until the loan is reIt is true that the purchaser ot a home retains physical

paid.

possession ot the property and that the buyer ot stock does not.
But this ditference does not alter the identical nature ot the
transaction, because there is no advantage in owning a home
except in living in it.

On the other hand, the only advantage

in Owning stock is in receiving dividends trom it and in being
able to dispose ot it at will, both ot which rights the purchaser of stocks retains in full as long as his margin remains
suffiCient.

And the identity ot margin buying with other com-

mercial transactions accepted as unquestionably ethical i. more
easily seen in the case ot the purchase of commodities or manufactured goods in large quantities where the loan is secured by
warehouse receipts.

In this latter case, the borrower receives

absolutely no benetit trom the goods he buys until:the loan is
repaid.
It is surprising, theretore, to find that even an ordinarily well-intormed and s,mpathetic economist like Xsgr. Ryan
m1sunderstand~

the stock exchange to the"extentot saying:

When the buyer completes one ot these trans-

actions, he merely receives or pays out a
sum based on the extent to which the price
ot the goods in question has risen or tallen. 2

12

In tairness to the author it must be noted that he i. speaking
about purely speculative trades, and that as tar as the speculator is tinancially concerned he might!!

!!!!

have done it

that way, but the abuse ot a thing does not alter its essential
position 1n the ethical scheme.

The above quotation, then, as

a statement ot tact is 1naccurate because every buyer must make
a considerable deposit with his broker betore any purchase 1s
made, and the broker must secure the tunds trom his own or someI

body else's capital tor the balance, because he must pay tor the
stock in tull within two days.

It is true, he may call upon his

customer tor more tunds it the stock should decline in price,
but most speculators are more ready to sellout at a loss than
to "throw in" more money on a declining market.

Hence, in the

ordinary transaction on the Exchange, the buyer, whether he
makes money or loses, pays out money every time he buys and
rece1ves money back every t1me he sells.
The odium which surrounds the practice ot margin buying is
perhaps due

pr1m~1ly

to the abuse made ot it by unscrupulous

brokers and inexperienced investors and speculators, espec1ally
during,the era ot the stock market "craze" in the late twenties.
Added to this is the tact that the broker, although seeming to

~-j;;;-A:-R7an, "The Koral Aspects ot Speculat10n", The Church
and Socia11sm, University Press, Washington, D.C.,-quoted by
teibell, Readings 1n EthiCS, Loyola Un1versity Press,
Chicago, 1926, SIB.
--

~F.
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act only as a buJing agent, is also a banker in the transaction,

and in this double and complex function seems to recall to the
ethician the many evasions practiced under cover ot the old
contractus Germanicus.

But the comparison is not to the point,

as the latter was excogitated for the express purpose ot circumventing ethical norms, whereas the former is a natural and convenient operation.

It would be perfectly agreeable to the

broker tor his customer to take the stock which he had bought,
bring it to his commercial bank, secure a loan on it, and then
pay the broker in full for the stock.

But there are obviously

several inconveniences which are obviated by the standard and
universal practice.

The broker, because of his specialization

in the business, can make something on interest and carrying
charges while still charging his customer less than he would
have to pay at a bank, and the customer is saved the trouble and
expense invol ved in securing a loan.
nothing more than

mo~tgaging

Buying on margin, then, is

t.-

the s\1.curi ties one has bought.

It

is more dangerous because of the rapid .nd extreme fluctuations
in security prices, and because it can be abused by unscrupulous
brokers allowing customers to buy on too thin a margin.

But

betore they advocate extermination, economists should try regulation, which has been instituted by the SEC and whose success
will be examined later.

Even a clever "bucket shop" operator

would not dare to have his customers "receive or payout a sum
based on the extent to which the price ot the good has risen or
fallen."

That would be too obvious, since a bucket shop must

14

try to present as nearly as possible the appearance ot a

--

bona tide broker's office.

To require little or no margin would

not only decrease this appearance ot similarity, but would also
bring less money into the owner's pocket.
Much more than buying on margin, short selling has been
criticized and condemned -- and rightly so.

Margin buying may

rightly be considered as a financial practice necessary to
enable all but the very richest to obtain an interest of ownership in the productive enterprises ot the nation -- an end which
practically all economists advocate as a means of preventing the
further undue concentration of economic power.

But the justi-

tication ot short selling is neither so easy nor so obvious, and
the misuse which has been made of it, particularly in the
"Crash" ot 1929, was devastating in its results.

But here

again, the analogy between Short selling on the exchange and
other commercial transactions which no one ever thinks of questioning is sntflclently close to glve great plausibility to a
plea tor its legltimacy, and on the grain exchange it i8 a
method of eliminating risk which the great flour milling companies claim they could not otherwise bear.
Short selling has been defined as "selling something you
don.t own".

From a certain aspect this is true, and to the lay-

man making a short sale 1t1sjust .!! if he we:re sel11ng something he did not own.
Scientific one.

But the philosophy ot

.!!!

~

is ha:rdly a

P:rom the legal viewpoint the transaction is

an enti:rely diffe:rent one.

A short sale, like any othe:r sale,

1s a contract to de11ver at a spec1fied time certain goods,
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tor which payment will be received; but in this case the seller
does not have the goods which he is going to deliver.

In order

to analyze ful17 this type of transaction, it will be necessary
to consider the grain exchanges also, since it is in those markets that the short sale is used most extensively and has its
widest economic importance. 3 There, too, are found certain
differences in the method of settling a short sale which will
help materially toward the understanding of its true nature.
\

On the grain exChange the contract always calls for a delivery
date several months away (except, of course, in the case ot
"cash" grain, which offers no difficulty and which is subject
to no controversy).

The short seller may fulfill his contract

by bU71ng actual (cash) gra1n:!.n time for the SPecified delivery
date, or he may buy another contract before that time and allow
the two to cancel out through the mechanism of the exchange.
The latter is b7 far the most common method of closing out the
speculative short sale.

A short sale,' therefore, trom the

juridical point of viewturns out to be nothing more than a contract for a future delivery of grain.

The prevalence ot such

contracts in the commercial world need hardly be indicated.
The construction or

manutact~ing

company whose bid is accepted

for a government contract is selling short, since it is promis3 For a complete exposition and discussion ot "hedging" in
grain, consult Ray,mond T. Bye, Principles ot Economics, 3rd
Edition, F. S. crotts and Co., lew York, lV!5, lSl sq.
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ing to deliyer certain goods.1D the tuture, the raw materials
tor which it does not yet own.

But the classic case is the

magazine which accepts perpetual .ubscriptions: the manageme.t
undertakes to supply paper made trom tree. which have not 7et
e~en

.tarted to growl

Thi8 i8 selling short with a Tengeance.

Since these eontracts are to be considered legitimate, the short
sale oathe e2Change must al.o be approved unle.s it can be further proved un&eces.ary or harmful.

The economic tunction per-

tormed b7 the or41nary contract tor tuture deliveP7 of goods not
yet own. . i. ':GbY1oua in the ca •• of manutactures, where the
product 1.s 'to De improved through an intermediar)' proce...

And

it is equallteY14ent in the.case ot the wholesaler who does not
change

the~·good811l

a physical way, because he gives them "time

and place ,.~1.1i'tt.s", which are of equal value in the economic
wor14 •. BlI:s '1t.is claimed that the speculator who trades on the
exchange, . .ci·nevel' owns so much as a Single bushel' ot wheat,
pertorms

DO

e4onomb, .ervice whatsoever.

Ignoring tor the time

being the. specu1ato.,~s. part 111 maintaining a tluid market where
the advent
prices

or

a luge oreler ,1'»_ a tlour mill will not send

rocketing,~1J.

'wil.l examine on17 his parb in making pos-

sible the "hedgtDc" operations by which all big handlers ot
grain insure themselves. against undue 108S.
The supply of wheat"'eing highly seasonal, it i. necessary
tor elevator and tlour mill owners to buy up and store grain tar
in,advance ot its aotualconsumption.

This meaas that in addi-

tion to the usual risks ot business .- the constant daniel' ot

1'1

total loss

b~

explosion and fire, the

possibilit~

of 108B

ot customers through competition, business depression, etc.
there is the additional and immense risk of a drastic decline
in grain prices, which means a corresponding drop in the price
of flour.

To predict and provide for this

the capacities of

an~

contingenc~

i8 beyonc

economist, save perhaps the most able,

since it would require an intimate knowlege of the world market
in grain, besides the political acmnen requi·red to foresee wars,
trade barriers, etc.

Therefore, the dealer in grain, just as

he insures hi8 plant and equipment against fire, so he insure a
the value ot his commodities in the only way he can -hedging.

b~

A hedging operation cons1sts 1n selling short on the

grain exchange, the Ch1cago Board of Trade, for example, a quantity corresponding to the actual grain bought and stored
in an elevator.

awa~

The "delivery" date ot the short sale should

also correspond roughly to the consumption date ot the grain on
hand.

Thus, 1t a miller should bU7 a hundred thousand bushels

ot wheat in Augaat to keep his m1il g01ng throughout the ensuing
twelve months, he would sell short on the Board ot Trade, say,
titt~

thousand bushels ot "December" wheat and tifty thousand ot

"Ka,."

wheat.

Then,

i~

the price should decline, he will make up

on his short 8ale What he loses on his stock on hand, and if the
price should rise, he will gain on his elevator supply what he
loses on the short sale.

In pricing his tlour he must always

use the current price tor wheat as a base, since there are alwa"s some millers bu,.ing at current prices for immediate

m1lli~

The importance ot this torm ot protection can readily be
gauged trom the widetluctuation in grain prices even 1n
nnormal n years, a t1uctuation more than sufficient to wipe out
all the ordinary protits ot regular business.

The short sale in

grain is, then, a means ot passing on the abnormal risks ot
business to those who can undertake to bear it -- speculators.
But at this point Msgr. Ryan object. that
••• traders in produce should take the risk
ot t1uctuating prices themselves. • •• there
aeems to be no good reason why the capable
dealer or manufacturer could not acquire a
a sutticient amoWlt ot ••• knowlege and
toresight. To set apart a body ot men tor
the sole purpose ot dealing in riska seems
to be carrying the principle ot division
ot labor unnecessarily tar ••• 4
However, the miserable tailure ot the very best tinancial and
economic ftservices n , with their highly trained and experienced
economista,

to~orecast

business and price trends with anything

approaching accuracy, i8 sufticient testimony to the imposs.ibility ot the average business man's acquiring the necessary
"know1ege and toresight·.

And sufticient toresight would have

to be very considerable, since in a bighly competitive and overbuilt industry like milling, the margin ot protit is so small
that a 108s ot a tew cents a bushel on the total amount handled
in one year might well be disastrous, even to the most stable.
As tor the statement that a separate body ot men tor the carrying ot risks is supertluous, there is the unquestioning acceptance ot the indispensable economic tunction ot the large 1nsur-

4---------Ope cit.,

520
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ance companies.

However much they may be accused of over-

charging or ot accumulating undue tinancial control over the
nation, they are never considered unnecessary as a class tor
bearing or distributing the more abnormal risks ot businesa,
such as tire, thett, etc.

It is, of course, conceivable that

another method ot handling the risk ot commodity price fluctuations could be devised, but the fact that no enterpriser bas
yet ventured into the field should be evidence ot its impractic
ability.

!he greatest difficulty is that grain price changes

equalize themselves (or could be made to do so from the poin.t

ot view of the insurance man) only over a period of several
years, and hence any attempt to handle such insurance would require immense reserves ot capital, and would lack that steady
income which the business man requires.

All other forma ot

insurance can be made to equalize receipts and payments every
year.
Hedging by means ot the short sale, therefore, must be considered a necessit"s- ot modern commercial procedure. 5 It is no
pertect, and almost ot necessity gives rise to numerous abuses,
which, bowever, may be mitigated by proper regulation.

The

necessity and effectiveness ot governmental regulation will be
considered later; the point to be

no~ed

here is that

!!

itsel[

short selling on the Board ot Trade is a necessary and pertectl

.. ----- .... _-

5 Here the objection might validly be raised that it is this
very short selling and consequent speculation which causes th
price fluctuations against which hedging is necessary. There
is much to be sald tor this pOint ot view, and it will be con
sidered at length in the tourth chapter.
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legitimate praotioe.
But short selling on the stook exchange is a slightly ditferent matter because ot a certain oomplioation in the matter ot
handling it.

The short sale in grain is always "oovered" by a

purohase ot some sort, and ot course, the person who sells stook
short expects eventually to buy back what he bas sold, but
actual delivery ot the stock sold is made to the buyer, not by
purchasing stock to give him, but by borrowing it.

~he

reason

tor this discrepancy in practioe between the two types ot exohange is that speculation in oommodities is always 1D. "tutures",
1.e., in contracts tor delivery at a date some months in the
tuture, whereas oorporate securities are traded tor immediate
delivery, i.e., within a tew days.

Henoe it can readily be seen

that there would be no use in selling short it one had to bU7
back almost immediately in order to make delivery to the purehaser.

Instead, the Short seller or his broker goes to the

loan market and "borrows" the necessary amount ot stock, atter
having put up an equal value ot collateral.

Ordinarily, the

loaner ot the stook eharges no turther premium than the use ot
the money during the period ot the loan.

~hen,

when the short

seller wishes to "eover", he buys back his stoek in the open
market, and with this purohase returns the number ot sbares borrowed.

Portunately for the speoulator, one share ot a partieu-

lar class ot stock in a given company is as good as any other,
so he 1s not at all bound to return the identioal oertificates
borrowed.

In the eth1cian's eftort to determine the legit1mac7 of
this transaction_ he does not tind that clear economic necessit7
that obtains in the case ot the short sale in grain.

Por the

sole benet1t to the economic s7stem which the short seller in
stocks is sa1d to confer 1s the more dub10us one ot maintain1ng
a stead7 market and of equalizing pr1ces.

As this

cla~

will be

weighed and judged 1n a later chapter_ the discuss1on, tor the
present, will be limited to the intrinsic aspect ot the trade.
Although the parallel which was drawn between the short
sale of gra1n and other very common and accepted commero1al
transactions can also be used here 1n a limited manner, since
merchants frequently have to borrow to complete contracts, 7et
the argument does not have the same torce because ot the Pure17
speculative 1ntent1on ot the seller.

He is not required to sell

short b7 an7 exigency ot his business, and doubtless does not
venture upon such a dangerous course ot action sole17, or even
primari17, from a sense ot his public duty to. check the advance
of an over-accelerated market.

And there is no doubt that the

short sale has been used tor selfish and criminal ends ever
since its appearance on the exchange.

The extent ot the abuse

ot short selling oannot be estimated, even approximate17, since
all the evidence ot its use is locked in private

a~ch1ves.

But

there can be little doubt that the precipitano7 ot the decline

ot the stock market in the autumn ot 1929 and its accompan71ng
contusion and ruin were due to the large-scale and premeditated
action of operators who cared much for their tinancial aggrand-
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izement and little tor the public weal.

O~anted

tbat

deflation was needed, and needed badly, yet it should have been
brought about in some other way less drastic and less

like~y

to

undermine the morale .of the people and their leaders.
However, on the other hand, it is very difficult to condemn short selling on its own intrinsic nature.

Therefore, tor

the present, we will have to confine ourselves to saying that on
the stock exchange it is a practice of doubtful utility and of
very dangerous possibilities, which perhaps should be abolished
entirely, or at least closely regulated if it can be shown to
have a certain general benefit in the just determine ot security
prices.

These matters will be more fully investigated later.

CHAPTER III
REGULATION OF THE STOCK MARKET
During the course of its long existence, the stock exchange
has been continually decried as an unhealthy center of gambling
and wild speculation in the weltare and integrity of the nation.
Most of the opposition has been undertaken in a crusading spirit
and has based its demands for the suppression or drastic regulation of the exchange more upon emotion than upon sober reasoning.

Two notable exceptions to this statement are the investigations-of the Hughes Commissionl of 1909 and the Pujo Committee 2 of 1912. The latter committee, while admitting the necessity and usefulness of a national stock exchange, brought forth
as its principal criticism the large turnover of stocks listed
on the New York Stock ExChange. 3 For example, there changed
hands during the course of the year 1911, over thirty-one million shares of General Motors stock, even though the entire
number of shares outstanding at that time was barely over five
million.

And Since, no doubt, a large proportion of those

1 "The Governor's Committee on Speculation in Securities and
Commodities", appointed by Governor Hughes of Bew York State
to investigate local conditions.
2 Otherwise known as the "Money Trust Investigation", who.e
report was made to the United States Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency.
3 Wall street Journal, Dec. 7, 1912, quoted in Van Antwerp,
W!rriam C., The stock EXChan!e from Wi thin, Doubleday, Page
and Co., Garden cIty, 1914, 77:--23
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shares never changed hands at all, the ratio ot turnover on
the rest was still higher.

Certain17, this tact would strike

one immedlately as lndlcatlng a tar too large speculatlve

ele~

ment ln that stock unless good reason could be glven for It.

A

commentator ln the Wall street Journal glves hls justlflcatlon,
whlch ls presumably the one current ln the "Street".
The ratl0 of slx to one suggests healthy
actlvlty ln the market ••• It ls concelvable
that a block ot stocks may pass through many
hands before lt arrlves at lts ultlmate owner,
just as a crop ot potatoes passes through a
long chaln ot handlers and buyers and dealers
before lt reaches the ultimate consumer •
• eant~e the number of potatoes has nelther
lncreased nor dlminlshed. But the potato crop,
whlch easl1y changes hands six times a 7ear,
ls flnally eaten. The stocks go on forever.
The legltimate holder ls not injured if they
change hands not slx, but sixty"times, provlded he i. secured by proper publiClty,
which the stock Exchange assures.
Thls quotation is given at length to show the type of
reasonlng whlch even an "enllghtened" and semi-otficlal apology
may make use ot.

!here ls no doubt that a ratio of slx to one

shows activlty, but whether this activity ls healthy or not ls
the whole point at lssue, and the parallel with potatoes ls not
entirely to the polnt.

Flrst of all, the present system ot dis-

trlbutlng potatoes 1. not to be held up as an ldeal in the economic system, and ln fact economlsts have not ceased to decry the
enormous wastes ln distrlbutlng produce in general.

secondly,

lt may concelvably be necessary that potatoes pass through so
man7 hands ln order to be handled efflclently.
------~--~

4 Ibid.

Here the ques-
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tion i8 -- must stocks be traded that often before they reach
the hands of permanent investors'

It is true that the stock-

holder who bas his certificates safely put away in his deposit
box is not injured directly by speculation on the exchange, but
the social cost of maintaining an institution ot the size ot the
New York Stock ExChange solely or primari17 tor selfish speculation muat a180 be considered.

The objection of the Pujo Com-

mittee was left unanswered, but its soundnes8 is amply demonstrated by the tact that later condemnation of the exchange has
generally been on the charge ot over-expansion.
The commission apPOinted by Governor Hughes three years
betore the more comprehensive and general Pujo investigation,
made a thorough study of the New York Stock Exchange, and produced a leDgthy, but very moderate, report.

Here again, the

chiet objection was the over-expansion of speculation.
The problem, wherever speculation is strongly
rooted, is to eliminate that which is wastetul
and morally destructive, while retaining and
allowing tree play to that which is beneticial.
The 4itticulty in the solution ot the problem
lies in the virtual impossibility ot distinguishing what ia practically gambling trom legitimate
speculation. The most truittul policy will be
tound in measurea which will lessen speculatlon
by persons not qualified to engage in it. In
carrying out such a polley, exchanges can
accomplish more than legislatures. 5
The Committee turther blames the Exchange tor not havlng realized its obllgations sooner, but places confidence ln it by
opposing the publlc demand tor incorporation in order to give

ot the Governor's Committee, quoted in Van Antwerp,
OPe Cit., 415 sq.

5 Report
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the governing committee ot the Exchange tul1 jurisdiction
over its members.

Such control would, of course, be lacking in

a corporation, whose members could make use ot an injunction
against the Exchange.
In common with most American business men, the members

ot

the stock exchanges ot the country have been very slow to recognize the extent ot their moral obligations toward societ,. as
a whole, and theirs perhaps is a greater guilt in proportion as
their re.ponsibilit,. is greater than the average.

But it must

not be supposed that the Exchange had done nothing betore 1909.
As early as 1869 the New York Stock Exchange had required all
corporations whose stocks were listed to register their issues
with independent banks or trust companies in order to obviate
any possibility ot traudulent over-issue.

About the same time

tull and instantaneous publicity was inaugurated tor all transactions by the installation ot the ticker s,.stem; and all stocks
granted the privilege ot tull ftlistingft, in contradistinction
to the smaller -unlistedft department, had to be thorough1,. investigated by a special Committee on stock List betore being
approved.

However, the Hughes Comm.i.ssion went turther in advo-

cating that the Excnange require more complete, extensive, and
trequent tinancial and operating reports trom the corporations
concerned.

Although the response to this advice may not have

been as prompt as the Commission might have deSired, it was
steady and progressive enough to lead Protessor W. Z. Ripley to
assert in 1926 --
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Beyond peradventure of doubt the N. Y. stock
Exchange is today the leading influence in
the promotion of adequate corporate disclosure
the world over. Its evident disposition to
accept fully the responsibilities of its
status ••• merits high praise. 6
The Hughes COmmission made several other minor recommendations, but, as mentioned previously, advocated no radical
legislation, and left things pretty much up to the Exchange members themselves.

One ot the reasons tor this attitude seems to

have been a lack ot tamiliarity with Exchange operations on the
part ot the members ot the COmmission, or perhaps a certain lack

ot ingenuity which would enable them to proscribe undesirable
practices without thereby prohibiting the desirable ones.

Cer-

tain it is that the rules of the present Securities and Exchange
Commission evince a complete grasp of the mechanism of stock
market technique and a great cleverness in directing it along
its due course.
The next great investigation ot the Exohange was undertaken
at the instance ot President Roosevelt in 1933.

Whatever praise

might have been dealt out to the Exchange betore 1929, even by
such a disinterested economist as Protessor Ripley, everyone
admitted that the debacle ot that year proved that another
attempt should be made at retorm.

Perhaps the blame should not

be put upon everyone ot the members and operators of the Exchange, but it seemed that many ot them had acted Violently
anti~soclally.

In launching his comprehensive investigation of

6 Main street and Wall street, Little,. Brown and Co., Boston,
~,210.

--
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the securities business in all its aspects, the President
enunciated a new principle of business.
This proposal adds to the ancient rule of
caveat emptor, the turther doctrine "let the
seiier a1so beware". It puts the burden of
telling the whole truth upon the seller. It
Should give impetus to honest dealing in
securities and thereby bring back public
contidence. 7
This statement reters to the Securities Act ot 1933, but it also
meant a new era in the stock market.

The Securities. Exchange

Act of 1934, based upon a most thorough investigation, created
the Securities and Exchange Commission to administer both Acts,
closely related as they are.

~s

action was a complete rever-

sal of the attitude ot the Hughes Commission.

No longer was

complete reliance placed upon the public spirit of the Exchange
and its ability to correct abuses, and no longer was the government considered inadequate to deal with the problem.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was given
almost complete control over the stock markets ot the country,
and at once proceeded to put in torce the provisions ot the Act,
and to use the discretionary powers accorded to it.

It is the

purpose ot this chapter, then, to consider how it has handled
each ot the major problems with which it was confronted.

The

first specitic problem to arise was that ot trading on margin.
As was demonstrated in the preceeding chapter, it is very difticult to condemn this practice absolutely, since it seems just as
7 Federal Securities Act,"Hearings betore the Committee on Interstate and ForelgiiComaerce ot the House ot R.presentativea~
U. S. Government Printing Ottice, Washington, D.C., 1933, 1.
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much a natural and constitutional right to buy securities
by means of a loan as to purchase a home in the same way.

More-

over, the customer is more likely to get favorable terms from
his broker than from his banker.

The chief 'danger of margin

bU7ing is that ot trading on too thin an equity, and it was froll
this angle that the SEC attacked it.

In the Act itself the fol-

lowing limitations were made:
For the initial extension of credit, an
amount not greater than whichever is the
higher of -(1) 55 per centum of the current market
price of the security, or
(2) 100 per centum of the lowest market
price of the security during the preceeding thirty-six calendar months,
but not more than 75 per centum ot the
current market price. 8
In other words, the investor or speculator must ·put up" at
least 25.per cent of the current market price, and is sometimes
required to pay up to 45 or even 75 per cent -- a rather cautious and conservative regulation in view of the Hughes Commission recommendation that the Exchange use its influence to prevent members trom "generally accepting business on a less margin
than 20 per cent."

The clause referring to the lowest price

within the past three years is added to differentiate between
the more speculative, and therefore volatile, shares and the
more conservative investments.

A stock, for example, which baa

never gone below 70 per cent of its present value may be purchased upon a margin of only 30 per cent, whereas one which has
declined to, say, a third of the current quotation within the
8----------Securities Exchanae Act of 1934, 7.
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preceeding three years requires a margin or 45 per cent.

The

wisdom ot this regulation is perfectly obvious, and in ract
similar policies had long been rollowed by the more conservative
houses, and had even been enforced to a limited extent by the
Exchange itself.

The Exchange possesses sufticient sanction

with regard to 1ta members in the power to suspend their expensive memberships temporarily or permanently, and has otten had
recourse to such a drastic measure.

Yet the SEC rul1ng artords

add1t1onal motivation by rendering the culpr1ts liable to proaecut10n by the Federal courts.

Moreover, the SEC 1s further

empowered to revise these requirements "up or down" as circumstances and the cond1tion of the money and secur1ty markets may
require.

The advantages ot this latter prov1sion are Ivery im-

portant.

Had the Commiss1on existed in 1929, stock prices might

not have reached nearly so high a level, and the consequent fall
m1ght not have been so sudden and disastrous.
prices had

beg~

For When securitJ

to exceed all reason and to "discount" the fu-

ture tor ten prosperous years, margin requirements could have
been raised to prevent further commitments and to keep prices
on a rairly sate level.
One ot the reasons tor the magnitude of the crash of 1929
was that very

ma~

brokerage accounts were carried on such a

slender margin that as soon as the market declined appreciably,
the brokers were rorced to call for more margin.

Since this

could not readily be supplied, they had to throw their clients'
holdings upon the market to be sold at any price that could be
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gotten.

A strictly-enforced rule ot adequate margins would

bave obviated the worst aspects of the debacle by preventing the
initial over-expansion of the market through a reduction in the
eftective purchasing power ot the speculator's original deposit.
In addition, the small investor could have been dissuaded from
trading at all, since many such never become confirmed "addicts·
until they are able to buy and sell in "round lots· (multiple.
of 100 shares), which they could do only if margin requirements
were low.

Then, when the break in the market did come, specu-

lative accounts would have been more ready to withstand the
sudden assault of the "bears·, and would have had sufficient
time to be bolstered up.

Finally, after the decline, the Com-

mission could have lowered margin requirements with satety, and
thus encouraged the entrance of further buying power into the
market.

Such flexibIlity, akin to the operation of the redis-

count rate in the money market, was entirely lacking in 1929,
when it was most needed.

Of course, the intelligent use of this

power of control would have required trained and sagacious economists, but, as 1s evidenced by the raising of the rediscount
rate early in 1929, they were not entirely laCking in that
frenzied era of expansion.

Tbtt action was taken mainly with a

view to curbing the stock market, but since the effect was only
indirect, except perhaps psychologically, the results were
scarcely noticeable.

BeSides, what handicap was it to have to

pay one or two per cent more for the money borrowed, if the
principle could be doubled within a few months?

Suoh was the

view of the optimistic speculator.
The effect, then, of this provision on margin regulation
is to reduce-speculation as a whole, and to protect by elimination the small speculator, who needs protection most, since presumably he is less able to bear his occasional, or inevitable
<as some would have it), losses.

It goes further in eliminating

some of the undesirable speculation by preventing the more
daring large operators from bringing additional instability into
the

mar~et

by their own precarious margins.

But comparatively

little was done to distinguish and quadlthat speculation which
is "practicall7 gambling" -- which was the principal objective
of the recommendations of the Hughes Commission.

The next

chapter will inquire into that speculation which, for lack ot
very obvious good or evil ettects, may be called useless or
parasitic.

For the present, evil speculation may mean that

which produces detinitely injurious etfects.
In its regulation ot short selling the SEC has shown a remarkable insight into the technical operations ot the Exchange,
as well as a good deal ot clever ingenuity in regulating them
according to ethic.1 norma.

As was pointed out in the previous

chapter, the chief objeet!on that can be raised against short
selling is not so much the illegitimacy of the practice itself,
but rather the harmful use to which

i~

has been put.

When a

small investor, deciding that a certain stock is selling far
above its worth, sells it short, he exerts a beneticial etfect
upon the market (if his judgment is correct) inasmuch as his
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sale tends to keep the price from rising further.

Moreover,

if he is fortunate and the atock declines fairly rapidl,.., hia
buying back of the shares sold short has a bolstering effect on
the stock.

In the same manner and in proportion, the large

operator trading in the same way has an equalizing and steadying
eftect upon the market.

But the short sale, especial17 in the

hands ot one or more men with ample resources at hand, can be
used with disastrous ettect to ftbreak ft the market. When a powerf'ul ftbear ft or group ot beara perceives that the market ia
ftthin ft i. a particular stock (i.e., there are f'ew buying order a
immediate17 below the current price), he or they may attempt to
break the price, and by means of' the short sale to reap a considerable gain at tbe expense of' others.
First of all, the bear sells any ot tbe stock which he may
happen to own, and perhaps also a good number ot shares short.
Since the market tor that stock is already thin, it begins to
decline, but the bear still gets a f'airly good price for hia
aales.

Then, When he deems the moment opportune, he plunges in

and starta to hammer down prices by ottering to sell to any bu,-

er at any price -- the lower the better.

Immediately the price

alumps badly in 1Dcreasing trading, ever,.. broker in the country
begins examining the accounts of' all his customers who hold tbat
security, and many calla tor more margin are sent out.

All this

may take place wi thin a half'-hour, and if' the decline is rapid
enough, numerous speculators will be notitied by telephone to
place additional aecurity tmmediately to strengthen their

account with their broker..

Inevitabl,. there will be aome

unable to comp17 with these margin calls, and their entire account. will have to be aold out at the price obtainable at the
moment, thus turther depressing the market.

The ettect ot the

initial decline, theretore, is cumulative, and ma7 easil,. turn
into a paDic.
under wa,. and

Meanwhile, the bear, once the decline is well
DlOving

ot its

OWl'l.

momentum, ceases selling and

tries to determine the point at which the bottom'will be

reach~

There he buys back, as covert17 as he can, all the shares he baa
sold ahort, and perhaps he may even "go long" again, realizing
a handsome protit on the whole transaction.
ot course, it must not be assumed that suCh bear operations

are eas,. or intallible means ot making mone,..

On the contrar,.,

they are very dangerous, and require great ahrewdnesa and daring
as well as much good luck.

In

the tirst place, it is ditticult

to tind out when the market i" thin.

Then, at al11' point ill the

decline new bU7iJlg orders may come rushing in, and ma,. even turn
the course ot prices in the opposite direction, leaving the bear
operator with a heavy loss.

But bear raids on the stock market

have been ot trequent occurrence throughout its histor,., and
the,. are particularl,. tatal when the raid is upon the whole list
ot stocks simultane.usl,. and by a determined and wealthy group

ot men pooling their resources.

To distinguish a minor bear

raid trom a tortuitoua conjunction ot order. ot the same kind
is ordinarily ver,. difficult, and has led common financial new.
parlance to ascribe ever7 rise or fall in prices to bull or bear

action. 9 At t~es there can be no doubt about it.
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The most

famous and disastrous bear raids took place during October and
November ot 1929, When with the average day's trading around
four million shares, sixteen million were traded on a single d
The catastrophic results ot this sudden tall ot prices needs no
development here.

Drastic liquidation doubtless was needed, but

coming as it did, it ruined many by the annihilation ot their
purchasing power, and destroyed the general confidence not only
in the stock exchange but also in the very foundations ot our
national economic lite.
To the task ot preventing any
the SEC set itself.

~.petition

of such a debacle

As alread,. in41cated, the problem is not

how to el1a1nate all short selling, since some of it is undoubt
ed1y beneticia1, but how to prevent the breaking of the market
through short sales.
sale ot

This was solved by prohibiting the short

an,. security -below the price at which the last sale
thereot, regular way, was e1'tected ••• or
(2) at such price unless such price is above
the next prece~41ng 41fterent price at
Which a sale ot such security, regular
wa7, was etfected ••• 10
(1)

(Refular wal means "long" stock, i.e., stock
ac uall,. owned.)
Furthermore, all orders in the future were to be marked either
"long" or "short", and
marked.

no~~ker

could execute an order not so

The etfeot ot this regulation was to make very ditfi-

--9 It.. is ..now
-- an established, it unfortunate, facon
--~-

~

parler.
10 Securities and Exchange Commission, General Rules and Regulations under!!! Securities ~ Exchange Ict,1941,~ol.
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cult any kind of short selling during a declining market,
and to practically prohibit the breaking of the market except
with "long" stock.

The ingenious effectiveness of these two

rules, especially the second, haa been quite remarkable.

If

only the first were in force, a bearish operator could begin to
break prices with a hundred shares of long stock, and then follow through with as much Short stock as would be bid for, using
his long stock only on each initial lowering of the price.

But

when the ahort sale must be above the prece,ding higher price
(in a declining market), his usual technique is impossible.
Of course, where enough resources can be pooled to start a
decline which will continue of its own momentum, breaking the
market with long stock will still be profitable, but this is an
extremely dangerous practice, and one which repays little for
the huge risk involved.

Moreover, the SEC has other ways ot

dealing with suCh large-scale piracy.

As soon as any unusual

activity has occurred in any stock, all the brokers involved are
immediately requested to turnish the names of buyers and seller.
to the CommiSSion, which can then prodeed against the ottender.
on the charge ot manipulation of prices.

Up until 1933 the

common practice ot every pool was to have its orders executed by
numerous difterent brokers, who might not themselves have understood the part they played in the whole.

Now this subtertuge

is unavailing.
Thus, two clever but simple rules have in great measure
achieved what the Hughes Commission ardently desired but was
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unable to accomplish -- the distinguishing of beneficial
speculation from that which (in intention at least) is practically gambling, and the protection of the one and the elimination
of the other.
The SEC 11kewise made rulings to cover all other undesirable practices upon the exchange, but these had already been
pretty well covered by existing state laws aa well aa by the
regulations of the various exchanges themselves.

"Wash sales"

(i.e., a fictitious sale by a broker to himselt for the purpose
of publicizing an artificial price), for example, are very easy
to detect aad eliminate.

"Matched orders" (i.e., two orders

given to different brokers by one and the same person for the
same purpose as a wash sale) are more difficult to detect, particularly in an inactive market; but the incentives for using
such methods are largely removed by closer regulation ot the
original security iasues, in connection with which it is desirable to maintain an artifiCially high price on the exchange for
the purpose of establishing an "over-the-counter" (non-exchange)
sale price for unsuspecting investors.

For the latter are

always qUite willing to bU7 stock directly from a dealer at a
price which they see publicized in stock exchange quotations,
thereby aaving the broker's commission.
Probably the greatest general reform made by the SEC is the
publication of financial and operating reports required of ever,
corporat~oD

Whose stock is widely distributed among the public.

Elaborate regulations were made to bring to light everything

S8

which might be ot value to the investor.

The SEC itself does

not undertake to publicize all the intormation it receives, but
it does respond to ever7 request; and hence current data are to
be had b7ever7 interested investor at an7. good llbrary, bank,
or brokerage house through the instramentalit7 ot such tinaacial
servlces as

poor's, and standard statistics. Toda7 at
11
last, the "lmpubllcit7" which Protessor Riple7 decrled so veheM~odl's,

ment17 and just17 is a thing ot the past tor a1'17 investor who
will go to the alight trouble ot examining the published recorda
Although the stock exchange had already shown the wa7, and
still turnishes valuable cooperation, most ot this publiclt7 is
required through the provislons ot the Seourities Aot rather
than the Securities Exchange Act.
also because ot the

~iad

Because ot this tact, and

complexit7 ot the rulea, no turther

anallais ot this aspect of the question will be made here.
Indeed, such an examination could well turn into a length7
treatlse on the ethics of aocountant ... report. 11'1 relatlon to
the investlng publlc.

11 Ope clt., Chapter VII, "Impubllolt7: What To Do about It."

CHAPTER IV

SOME LARGER ASPECTS OF REGULATION
Even though 1t be reasonably clear that the stock exchange
is a necessary inst1tution and that its more flagrant abuses
have been cleared

up~

there still remains the fact that it seems

to have subordinated its primary function to the wholly secondary one of speculat10n.

The primary purpose of the exchange 1s

to provide a market tor corporation securities so that pr1ces to
investora may be arrived at in a tree and open manner, and with
full informat1on as to market conditions available to all part1cipanta.

In tcn-warding these ends the New York Stock Exchange
has been unt1ring1y aggressive. l Nor 1s 1t to be denied that
speculation must playa large part in such a central market.
Altred

.arshall~

tor example, asserts that --

It has been we1l observed that a speculator~
who without manipulating prices by false
intelligence or otherWise, anticipates the
tuture correctly, and who makes gains by
shrewd purchases and sales on the Stock
Exchange ••• generally renders a public serv1ce by pushing forward production where it
is wanted and repressing it where it is not. 2
Here, however, it must be noted that speculation on the exchange
doe. not directly react upon production by immediately supplying
the corporations concerned with new cap1tal to extend their

ct.

H. S. Martin, The New York Stock Exc~e, New York, 1919,
Chapter 22, 8The Eiin&nge as-a Mora! Force.
2 Principles ~ Economica, Macmillan and Co., London, 1930, 8th
Edition, 432, n.
39
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plants and facilitIes, for such trading is merely in stock
that has already been issued and fully paId for.

Any gain from

a rIse in price is receIved by the indivIdual holder of the
stock, and Dot by the issuing company.

But a rising market for

any particular company's stock would enable It to issue new securities, whether bonds or stocks, more readily and easily, in
larger amounts. and on better terms for its own

~1nancial

inter-

est than it would if the publicity of the exchange were lacking.
And, as Professor Bye says,
A uae~ul adjunct to both investment and commercial banking is the stock exchanges ••••
Investors would be reluctant to put their
money into stocks or bonds' if there were
no machinery for selling them later If desired. Moreover, by finding a market for
older issues, underwriters can sometimes
get their customers to buy new issues which
the former are trying to dispose of. 3
Thus the exchange supplies the publicity and ready market which
even the "permanent" investor looks for in buying any securIt7.
As an illustration of the common estimation of the desirabilIty
of thIs lIlting ot a security, the "spread" in price between a
lIsted and an unlisted bond of the same compan7 and the same
security is sometimes a couple of points.
Then too, it must be remembered that speculation makes for
a larger and more active market, and that

----------..

The larger the market for a commodity the
smaller general17 are the fluctuations in
its price, and the lower is the percentage
on the turnover which dealers charge for
doIng business in it. 4

3 Ope cit .• , 211.

4 Alfred Marshall.

OPe cit~.

328,
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Although the first part of the statement is open to challenge,
since speculation is commonl7 blamed for the violent fluctuations of stock prices, yet the second part is abundant17 true.
The purchase, for example, of a hundred shares of stock selling
anywhere between a hundred and two hundred dollars a share would
cost on17 twenty-five dollars -- on a contract amounting to anything less thaD twenty thousand do11arsl

This commission

amounts to no more than a quarter of one per cent; a like rate
in the real estate business would put all the realtors out of
business in short order.

Of course, they perfform functions

which the stock broker does not, but that is the advantage of
the central market.
Another aid which speculation gives the investor, especially the small one, is in the purchase and sale of "odd lots"
(i.e., fewer than a hundred shares).

Up until the middle of the

twenties, most odd lots used to be handled on the Consolidated
Stock Exchange, since defunct, but after that time all such
orders bave been taken care of by an elaborate machinery on the
exchange itself, without, however, the investorts losing the
benefi~s

of small commissions.

There are two large houses in

New York City which deal exclusively in odd lota, and to whom
all other brokers turn over their orders.

These orders are not

actually executed on the floor of the Exchange, but are grouped,
cancelled out whenever pOSSible, and "traded against" on the
Exchange.

The customer submitting the order is guaranteed a

price of an eighth (or sometimes a quarter) of a point away from
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the next round lot sale which takes place after his order
has been received.

This means that if he is buying stock he

paya an eighth ot a, point more than the next sale printed on the
ticker tape, or if he is selling he receives an eighth of a
pOint less.

The reason for trading exclusively in round lots on

the "floor" is quite apparent from the daily volume ot business,
but the rule does leave a huge problem to be solved.

The odd

lot houses were formed to take up the challehge, and have
handled it very satisfactorily.

Since they guarantee prices

based upon the next sale, they are continuously both "long" and
"short· stock, which they must sell or buy in as best they can.
Obviously, such a business can be conducted only on a large
scale, and that is why there are only two houses handling all
the odd lot business.

If these houses were not allowed to sell

short and to speculate in buying stock, the small investor would
have to lose two or three pOints, instead ot an eighth, in buying or selling his odd lot.
Here again, a speculative market is a means of placing the
small man more nearly on a par with the wealthy capitalist.

In

tact, in a rising market the small buyer has a distinct advantage: he is practically guaranteed the next sale, whereas a
large order would have to wait its turn and pay a higher price.
But in spite of these very obvious services of speculation
in the cause of permanent and sound investment, it is maintained
that speculation on the stock exchanges of the country, and of
the world, has expanded beyond all reason, and has come so to
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dominate these markets that they seem to have lost their primary function ot oenters of investment and to have turned into
glorified gambling dens. 5

There can be little doubt that this

charge has a tirm foundation in fact, although the extent to
which speculation dominates the exchange cannot be ascertained
with any degree of accuracy.

However, the eminent authority of

John Moody lends weight to the opposite opinion in the statement
that "a greater sum of money is annually lost in this country
through unwise investment in Wall street, than through pure
speculation."S
At this point it would be well to try to distinguish the
various types ot speculative dealings to be found in general us
First of all, the speculator must be distinguished from the investor.

The latter buys a stock for a relatively long term, and

more with a view to the income to be derived from it than tor
any antiolpation of selling it at an increase in price.

The

speculator, on the other hand, buys stock for the "short turn"
solely with a view to selling it at a higher price.

But this

"short turn" may vary trom a few minutes to several years, depending upon whether the buyer is a long-term speculator or a
."specialist" who happens to be "making a market" in the particu~

.. --------

5 Another serious charge against stock market speculation is
that it ties up huge amounts ot capital in the form of brokers'
loans, thereby withdrawing it from production. This question
is thoroughly discussed in Horace White's .one~ and Banking,
Ginn and Co., Boston, 1925, New Edition by c. .~ppets and
L. A. Froman, S12 sq. Since prominent authorities are cited
for contradictory views, and since the authors espouse neither
aide, the matter will not be considered in this thesis.
S The ~ !! !!!! street Investing, Moody Corp., New York, 1906,
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lar stock he is handling.

III putting an ethical evaluation

upon speculatlve transactlons, then, there occurs the dlfflculty
which long ago confronted the Hughes Commisslon -- the separation of that which is good from what

~s

practically gambling.

The long-term speculator may generally be admitted to pertorm a
useful economic service in directing the flow ot capital, as was
previously indicated.

It may be argued, too, that the two-min-

ute speculator may pertorm an equally useful service.

If, for

example, an order comes to the floor ot the New York Stock Exchange to sell a thousand shares ot

u.

S. Steel "at the market"

(i.e., at the best price obtainable at the moment) at a time
when there are tew buying orders at hand, the seller would stand
little chance of getting a good price unless there were speculators at the post.

Large blocks of stocks held by 1nvestors

must frequently be sold on short notice When neither the owner
nor his broker would be capable of dlrect supervision in securing a good price.

However, in every active stock there are al-

ways a tew speculators, floor-brokers and speciallsts, who know
the ordinary demand and supply ot that particular stock.

So,

when a large selling order comes in a weak market, they bid
against eaCh other to get it, knowing that in all probability
they will be able to dispose of it at a small profit within a
tew hours.

The proti t taken may be only an eighth or a quarter

ot a pOint, but it the operation is repeated often enough, as it
is, a good living can be made from this practice.
Such speculation, though in no wise long-term, should be
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clasaitied as beneticial, since it is essential to the maintenance ot a ateady market.

Likewise, the similar "in and out"

technique ot the odd lot dealer reacts decidedly to the advan-

--

tage ot the bona tide lnvestor.

And it otten happens that stock

bought tor long-term investment is sold within a shart time because the owner thinks that it has rlsen above what lt is worth,
and thereupon decides to take a speculator's profit, or because
he reallzes he made a poor choice.
The thing

~ch

ultimately puts speculation in the category

ot good or bad is the intention ot the speculator, but slnce
regulation could scarcely be undertaken on that baSiS, other
norms Will have to be applied.

The simplest and most obvious

course to pursllB-: in the elimination ot evil speculation, the
kind which rests upon vague rumors, "tips", and manipulation,
would be to close down the stock exchanges tmmediatelyand completely.

While such a course has been openly advocated by very

tew, it would seem to be implied in the condemnations generally

" "
meted out to the exchange • •sgr. Ryan, tor example, in'a resume
ot his analysis says -Speculation as an institution is ot doubttul
utility; socially lt ls productive ot great
and widespread evils; and morally it is vitiated by a very considerable amount ot dishonest "deals" and practices. 7
Likewise, Fr. Slater cites with approval the suppression ot
speculation on the Berlin Stock Exchange.

----------7 Ope Cit.,

528.
8 Rev. T. Slater, S.J., ·Speculation",
XIV, 211.

8

~

Catholic

Encycloped1~
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But the Berlin stock Exchange is a ease in point which
shows the futility and positive harm which follows strict and
repressive measures.

In justice to the German economists of the

time, it must be said that a commission of investigation had
turned in a moderate report, similar in tone to that of the
Hughes COmmission in this country, but the agrarian Reichstag
took matters into its own hands and formulated the Bourse Law
of 1896.

The etfect ot the prohibition ot ordinary speculation

on the Exchange was to drive it into "underground" channels,
where it flourished in a more evil manner than ever.

Protessor

Emery enumerates a number of disastrous ettects, among which
were the toll owing
(1) Fluctutations in prices have been increased
rather than decreased. The corrective influence
ot the bear side ot the market having been restricted, the tendency to an inflated bull
movement was increased in times ot prosperity.
(2) 'rhe money market has been increasingly
demoralized through the greater tluctuations
in demand tor tunds to carry speculative
cash accounts.
(3) Finally, the ettect ot interterence,
increased cost, and legal uncertainty was to
drive business to toreign exchanges. The
number ot agencies ot toreign houses increased
tour or five told, and much German capital
tlowed into other centera, especially London,
tor investment or speculation. 9
Ten years atter the enactment ot the original legislation a
Government commission was forced to admit that --

_.... __ ...... _-- ..The
_--

dangers ot speculation have been increased,

9 Henry Crosby Emerl' "!en Years' Regulation ot the stock Exchange in Germany , ~ !!!! Review, May, 1908.
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the power of the market to resist one-sided
movements has been weakened, and the possibilities ot using inside information have
been enlarged. 10
Acting upon the recommendations of this report, the Reichstag
repealed most ot the provisions relating to trade in stocks, but
still retained the prohibition against short selling in grain
and flour until the continued disastrous result. proved beyond
question its futility.
As there are no open markets for these products
and no continuous quotations, both buyera and
sellers are at a disadvantage; prices are more
fluctuating than they were befere the passage
ot the law against short selling. 11
The On17 experience ot this country in a similar matter occurred during the Civil War.
When the greenbacks became the regular mone'1
ot the count~, there was established in the
city ot New York a "gold exchange", a speculative market where people met dail'1 to buy
and sell gold ••• As the greenbacks depreciated, there were great complaints about the
high price of gold, and man,. people charged
that the speculation on the gold exchange
was responsible... Congress gave ear to the
complaints and passed a law abolishing the
gold exchange and forbidding all speculative
dealings in gold. The result was immediate
and disastrous. Nobody knew where he could
get gold or sell gold or what the price waa •••
Instead there was bargaining and higgling at
various places, and wide1,. differing prices
were quoted in ditferent places. The price,
instead of falling as hoped, immediately rose
higher than ever... The demand for the restoration of the exchange was so prompt and
so strong that Congress repealed the law just
two weeks atter its passage. 12

-_ .. _-------_ ....

10 Ibid., 240
11 Hughes Commission Report, quoted in VanAntwerp,
12 Fairchild, Furniss, and Buck, OPe cit., 90.

OPe

cit.,

44~
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The flrst polntto be noted about these two unsuccessful experlments 1. that the free and open market of the organlzed exchange was replaced
fraud was

ea.~

8econdl~,price

b~

an under-cover and disorganized one where

to perpetrate and hard to dlscover and

rectif~.

fluctuations in Wheat in Germany became more

violent, and the price of gold in this count17 went still higher.
And it was the exact opposite of these effects that the respective lawa were intended to accomplish.
With regard to the first point, the fundamental fact Which
the legislators overlooked is that wherever large numbers of
people are interested in buying and selling a homogeneous commodity, there will not

onl~

be created markets for thatcommod-

lty, but they will all tend to gravltate to one central place,
Where, because of the large volume of business, the market will
become highly organized and complex, and its operatlons open and
public.

And that is exactly the case with the stock market.

In

splte of it. external similarity to a gambling casino, it is a
natural and inevitable result of fundamental economic tendendles
where free men are allowed to use their money as their own.
Throughout thls discusslon it is very important to keep in mind
that the argument is not that stock exchange operations are
ethical because they are ineVitable, but rather that, being in
themselves indifferent, they serve the public interest When conducted as they are.

To close down or cripple the present work

of the stock exchanges would be to open the door to prlvate vice
and public disaster.
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As to the effect upon prices of organized and unorganized
markets, the two cases cited do not prove anything conclusively.
The rise in gold prlces subsequent to the

c~oslng

ot the

excnAn~

was due prlnclpally to other factors, such as tear inspired by
the drastlc move, and by the lncreaslngly grave
tlon ot the government.

tlnancia~

sltua-

But the vlo1ent fluctuatlon ot graln

prices atter the restrictions ln Germanrwouldaeem to lndicate
some stabillzing influence on the part of tree speculatlon on an
organlzed market.

In this ease, the complete and tull dissemin-

ation ot news and the openness ot tradlng atforded by an exchange had not been lost; what was lacking was the discountlng
ot the

~uture

short 8elllng.

by "tutures" tradlng and the restoring ettect ot
Contlnuous trading ln tutures have the advantage

ot keeping betore the eyes ot the large graln consumers the necessit7 ot spreadlng a definitely 11mited supply ot grain over
a whole year's consumptlon, and thU8 tending to even out tluctuations trom month to month.
So much has been said about the practice ot breaking the
market by short selling that its more ordinary use is apt to be
overlooked.

Since so to break the market i8 dangerou8 and re-

qulres large stores ot capltal, the common use ot short selling
is merely to protit by selling at the top and buying back at the
bottom.

When a market declines rapidly, there is always a con-

siderable "short interest" which is looking tor a chance "to
take a protit" by bUJing back, and this short interest is the
only thing which makes possible any market at all on day8 ot
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real panic, such as the worat days ot 1929.

During these times,

when everyone waa trying to dispose ot stock as fast as he could
do so, there was not a single issue tor which as many buyers
could not be found as there were sellera.

ot course, the sel-

lers had to take greatly reduced prices, but that was better
than being torced to hold, as many real estate investors were
obliged to do, for lack of buyers at any price.

How much ot

this "support" in the market was due to the short interest, is
still a aecret, and will probably always remain so, but it i&
believed to have been the major part.
Prom all this might be drawn the following conclusion -that the abolition of the exchange is impossible and

undesirabl~

and that any regulation or legal restriction which drives business ott the regular exchange deteats its own purpose.

But

it~

ia equally clear that the exchange must be subject to constant
and close surveillance and regulation to curb the inevitable
tendency to over-speculation.

This regulation should take on a

twofold torm -- blanket rules designed to discourage too-expansive tendencies, and certain discretionary powers suitable for
coping with evasive practices.

In this country the former have

been supplied by the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange
Act, and wide discretionary powers are in the hands
An idea

ot

the SEC.

ot the extent to which speculation has been curbed by

these acts may be gained trom the tollowing table.

It may be

objected that other forces were at work also, and no doubt this
is true.

But there were torces working in both directions, and
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there seems to be no good reason tor ascribing the cause to
anything else than governmental regulation.
TOTAL SALES ON THE N. Y. STOCK EXCHANGE 13
(in millions ot shares)
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933

- 452
- 449
- 577
- 921
- 1125
- 810
- 577
- 425
- 655

1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942

-

324
382
496
410
298
258
208
167
124

From this table it will be seen that when regulation began
in 1934, total yearly sales were cut more than halt, and that
the "boom" year ot 1936 scarcely brought trading up to the level
ot what brokers called the exceedingly dull years ot 1931 and
1932.

Added to this is the much lower level of stock prices,

which makes the total

dollar~volume

ot speculation much smaller.

And, whatever, may be the cause, the American public has

en-

tirely lost its stock market "craze", and is no longer dominated
by that "get rich quick with no work" mentality, which was the
greatest evil, public or

p~1vate,

which the stock exchange ever

had a hand in.
However, it may possibly be argued whether or not even this
large reduction has brought speculation within reasonable bounds,
and it at some time in the tuture a state ot prosperity and unwarrented optimism should again prevail, what guarantee is there

.. --_ .. ------

13 World Almanac, ~, New York World Telegram, 427.
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that the present s7stem ot regulation will be able to cope with
it?

In that case full reliance must be placed on the.wisdom and

integrity of the members ot the SEC.
can impose the restriction ot

~gher

On a rising market th87
margin and moderate use of

the short sale, and to a declining market they can giTe the support of a reverse procedure.

Moreover, manipulation on a large

scale can be prev.ented by prompt investigation and energetic
prosecution.

What has been done up to the present in this matt

is not definite17 clear, since the SEC reports cover its administration ot several acts besides the Securities Exchange Act,
but up to June 30, 1940 it had conducted

6,65~

lnvestigations,

indicted 1,300 persons, and convicted 542. 14
The indivldual states, especially New York, can and have
curbed speculation indlrect17 by a judicious s7stem ot transter
and other taxes.

The heavy transter tax now in force makes

tradlng for the &hort term leiS profitable, and hence less common, and a tax on short stock tends to reduce the feequency ot
short sales.

A suggestion that state laws be passed prohiblting

the resale of stock within a short time is full ot possibilitie
If correctly drawn up, it should discourage, if not eliminate,
that trading tor the "&hort swing" which is practically gambling
However, exceptions would have to be made tor the odd-lot broker,
who in the daily non-speculative conduct ot his business makes
more "speculative" commitments than anyone else.

Likewlse, it

14 ~ Work ~ ~ Securities and Exchange Commission, U. S.
Government Prlnting Ottice, Washington, 1940, 14.
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possible, the present "market-making" activities of the specialist should not be interfered with.

In any case, no legislation

should be attempted without thorough investigation and expert
testimony, and perhaps a preliminary period of trial.
The point to be kept in mind at the end of this discussion,
is that the nation has progressed a long way since the day- ot
1929.

Each step in the curbing of speculation has been slow,

methodical, and successful.

There will, no doubt, have to be

further legislation in the same direction, but it should be done
at the same pace and in the same manner as that put through in
the thirties.

CONCLUSION
The aim of this thesis has been to separate the component
elements which go to make up the ethical constitution of the
stock exchange, to examine each of them separately, and thus

t~

avoid the common practice, and resulting oonfusion of judgment,
of trying to evaluate the complex institution of stock speculation

!!

globo.

In the first

~apter,

the exohange was con-

sidered merely as a market, and was shown to be a natural and
inevitable tendency because of the homogeneity of shares of
stock.

A single national market also led to the formation of a

monopolistic assooiation with a highly oomplex organization,
which is a remarkably near approach to the "perfect market"
ideal of the economist.

The second ohapter undertakes to ex-

plain the nature of margin trading and short selling, and tries
to tree them of the mystery and prejudice in which they are
generally shrouded.

Margin trading is seen to be no different,

tundamentally, from the purohase ot real estate, or any other
commodity, on a mortgage or time payments.

And short selling,

although it is dangerous because of the open door it leaves to
abuses, is also based on familiar and generally accepted principles of contract or trade.
However, in spite of the legitimacy of the exchange and 1
approved practices when Viewed in themselves, there remains the
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that speculation has run rampant to such an extent that

public authority has, upon various occasions, deemed it necessary to intervene.

~irst

The

thorough investigation was that

ot the Hughes Commission of 1909, which found grave abuses, especially in the overexpansion of speculation, but admitted itself unable to

eli~nate

them without unduly penalizing legiti-

mate traders.

It contented itself with oalling upon the New

York Stock Exohange itself' to take the situation in hand and
remedy it.

It remained for the Roosevelt administration

o~

1932 to formulate laws which would ingeniously eliminate the
undesirable elements without too muoh curtailing the

~reedom

of

the market.
Since there has been serious advocation
lition of speculation, the

~ourth

o~

the total abo-

chapter examines the experi-

ence of Germany in its drastic regulation of the Berlin stock
Exchange late in the last century, and of the United states in
its attempt to prohibit speculation in gold during the Civil
War.

Both of these etfort. only increased the violence of

price changes and offered cover for dishonest practices, showing that legislation may easily aggravate the situation by becoming too drastic.

The SEC, on the other hand, has cut down

trading on the New York Stock Exchange by one-half or more,
without driving it either abroad Cas happened in Germany) or to
under-cover operation <as was the case with gold in this country
during the Civil War).

Individual states have also helped to

discourage speculation and the rapid turnover

o~

securities by
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b7 heavy transfer and other taxes.
But in spite of all this, there ma7 still be good reason

to doubt whether or not the stock exchanges of the countr7 produce more good effects than evil ones.

If stocks are bought as

investments, their resale should be the exception rather than
the rule, and the figures on the turnover of stock shares show
that this is obviously not the case.

Some prOVision for a mar-

ket should exist, but the exchange seems based on the principle
that speculative purchases of shares should predominate.
what can be done about it?
strongl~

The experience of

h1stor~

But

dictates

against total abolition, or even drastic regulation.

Such procedure is worse than no regulation at all, because it
must soon be reversed, and gives the supporters of the stock
exchange a talking point strong enough to block all further
attempts at retorm.
Perhaps the best place to start would be with the individ
al investor.

What institution should undertake to give him a

slightly less gullible attitude toward the stock exchange is
highly problematical, but .that the average investor and speculator needs education and an infusion of prudence is abundantly
evident.

When the United States went oft the gold standard,

there was an immediate rush to buy the gold stocks, among them
the Yukon Gold Mining Co., and it was not until much later that
man7 hasty investors found out that the Alaskan properties of
that company had long ceased to yield any gold, and that the
firm had moved# lock,'stock, and barrel, over the Pacific to

mine tin in Malaya.

Likewise, some people bought Seaboard
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Air Line (R.R.) under the impression that it was operating airplanes, or Cord Corporation under the illusion that it was manufacturing the Cord automobile, wheras it was really a holding
compan}' for Auburn (which made the Cord car) and other smaller
properties.

To everyone of these investors information, com-

plete and accurate and up-to-date, was easily available, if
only he had the initiative to look for it.

No doubt the bro-

kers concerned might have been at fault in some instances, but
it is not generally politic, or even polite, to ask a customer
i t he knows what he is doing.

And all reputable houses main-

tain an expensive information bureau for the free use of their
customers.
Next to the investing and speculating publiC, the ones who
could do most to reform the stock exchange are the members and
brokers themselves.

Already the various exchanges of the coun-

try have done much to inculcate a public spirit in their members, but among men who are intent upon making their fortune by
their unaided efforts and skill, selfish individualism has a
strong and tenacious hold.

But there is no reason to doubt

that conditions will improve gradually, if slowly, especially
under pressure from the SEC.
l!'t is with the SEC itself that lies the greatest hope for

immediate improvement.

The provisions of the various acts

which it administers are cleverly contrived, and its own discretionary powers are sufficiently wide to handle an}' eventual-
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ity.

What specific new regulations should be made it would

be difficult to indicate at this time.

The most desirable

would seem to be a requirement that every share of stock be
held· a certain length of time before it could be sold, thus
eliminating that "in and out" speculation which is the most
wasteful and detrimental.

But, as indicated in Chapter IV, a

blanket rule would work hardships on the smaller investors. who
need consideration most of all.

Perhaps the good effects would

outweigh the evil. but at least extensive studies should be
made before any legislation is enacted.
In all regulation a cardinal point should be consideration
tor persons and attitudes.

It the SEC can gain the good will

ot the brokers and investing public. its rules and regulations
will become etfective; if not, they can be large17 evaded.

The

broker and professional trader must be impressed with his civic
responsibility. and the investor with the prinCiple that real
wealth is produced by labor and not by lucky speculation.

Such

education is necessarily slow and incomplete, like most other
education, but there is no reason for not trying to impart it.
Nor must it be forgotten what has already been done.

Wit&

in ten years the New York Stock Exchange has been reduced trom
a much-publicized institution on which millions of people hoped
and expected to gain their fortune, and which required the services of thousands of workers, to its present-day status ot a
halt-forgotten adjunct to the nation's economic life, Whose
broker-members must constantly cut their staffs and merge their
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firms in order to stay in business at all.

In contrast to

the first World War. the present conflict has taken the institution of organized spe.culation out of the public eye, and haa
pushed it further and further back into the realm ot oblivion
until there can hardly be said to be a contemporary stock exohange problem at all.

But unle'ss the government of America

goes over to some form of state sooialism, the problem is sure
to arise again, as it did in the twenties, but the next time
will find the nation ready for it, having profited by its previous experience and having at hand the means to cope with the
situation.
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